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Measuring the Impact of Competition on
Pricing Behaviors in a Two-Sided Market*
Minkyung Kim**
Inseong Song***
The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses
where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an
oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and
firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal
and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward
looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer
purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future
states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic
aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms
in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect.
Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to
win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing
behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured
the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive
structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition
on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects.
In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we
compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly
market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers
and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking
behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained
as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical
dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video
game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided
* This research has been supported by Institute of Management Research at Seoul National University. Inseong Song
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markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base
anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base.
The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible
software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony
PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the
expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly.
Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures.
The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for
Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of
competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for
the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry
standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing
firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory
stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.
Key words: two-sided market, indirect network effect, merger, competition, pricing, numerical
dynamic programming, video game console industry

Ⅰ. Introduction
Shoppers prefer shopping malls with a variety
of selection of retail stores and retailers want
to open a store in a popular mall. Similarly,
smartphone users decide to adopt a handset
with an operating system that runs many applications and application developers are motivated to launch applications for a platform that
is popular among users. In many industries,
two types of participants interact through platforms and affect each other’s decision about
whether to join the platform or not. Such indirect network effect is a distinct property of
two-sided markets. Indirect network effects are
36 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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well exemplified in various two-sided markets
such as shopping malls, video game consoles,
and credit card payment system. Note that the
indirect network effect would not require the
same-side inter-consumer interaction such as
word-of-mouth. Some markets are characterized
by the presence of inter-consumer interaction.
For example, consumer movie choice can be
affected by other consumers’ choice (Kim and
Kim 2013). However the same side inter-consumer interaction is not necessary in the twosided market. What matters is the indirect
network effect that occurs across markets. Due
to the indirect network effects, firms in a twosided market have an incentive to invest to
accumulate the installed base in the early period

of the market. Major portion of such investment takes the forms of subsidy to one side of
the market. That is, firms typically subsidize
one side of market by lowering the prices to
increase the size of the installed base. A larger
installed base would increase the willingnessto-pay of the other side. It can be easily expected that the incentive for a platform to
subsidize one side of the market is stronger
when platforms compete each other. With strong
indirect network effects, platforms are eager to
win the battle for standard and thus have
stronger incentive to increase its network size
as early as possible. While such qualitative expectation on the impact of competitive pressure
on firms’ incentive to subsidize can be easily
formed, little empirical research has been done
to measure the extent of such impact.
Why is it important to measure the impact
of competition on pricing? The issue of assessing competitive effects is important to both
policy makers and managers. First, with such
measures, one can assess the impact of a
merger in an industry with indirect network
externalities. The impact of mergers has been
studied mostly for consumer packed goods. To
our best knowledge, no formal research has
provided a measure of the impact of competition, or merger equivalently, in a market with
indirect network effect. Given the fundamental
differences in demand and supply between
consumer packed goods and platform products,
existing approaches used for consumer packed

goods may not be suitable for the cases for
two-sided platforms. This study provides a formal procedure to measure the impact of competition on pricing in a two-sided market. Policy
makers may utilize such assessment procedure
when making decisions on merger approval in
a two-sided market. Second, competition is of
a great interest to managers. Managers want
to figure out how their pricing decision should
reflect competitive pressures. The approach used
in this paper also gives a hint on how to incorporate competitive factors optimally in making pricing decisions for products with indirect
network effects.
The impact of competition has been a major
research issue in marketing and economics. One
can assess the impact of a horizontal merger
by comparing pricing behaviors of firms before
and after a merger, if data are available. Kim
and Song (2012) estimate the impact of a horizontal merger between manufacturers on channel pricing behaviors using a market data set
obtained from toilette paper industry. By comparing the differences in model parameter estimates before and after the merger between
Kimberly and Scott, they find that the merged
manufacturer becomes tougher in pricing. Although
such approach is desirable, researchers may
suffer from the unavailability of data in many
cases. In fact, marketers and policy makers
want to know the impact of a merger before it
really happens, because they need to make decision on whether to invest on a possible merger
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or whether to approve a proposed merger. An
alternative approach has been utilized to overcome the data unavailability. In that approach,
researchers first develop a structural model in
which the model parameters represent policy
invariant parameters. And the estimation results are applied to merger simulation analyses
where equilibrium prices are computed for hypothetical merger case. Such approach has been
adopted in many studies to investigate the impact of a possible merger in consumer packed
goods such as the ready-to-eat cereal (Nevo
2000) and carbonated soft drinks (Dube 2005).
For such products, the market conditions are
expected to be stationary. Since the merger is
not expected to produce any dynamics in such
stationary market, the merger simulation is
straightforward. However, the notion of the
two-sided market explicitly recognizes the dynamic aspect of indirect network effects for both
demand and supply side. Therefore, the existing approach for the merger analysis cannot be
directly applied to two-sided markets.
Many two-sided platforms are durable products as is the case for video game console. It is
well known that for durable products, consumers’ strategic forward-looking buying behaviors
are related to the shape of market level diffusion curve (Song and Chintagunta 2003).
Accounting for such forward-looking behaviors
requires a dynamic model setup. Previous studies
in economics and marketing have developed
structural models that account for consumers’
38 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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forward looking behaviors and/or firms’ dynamic
decisions on marketing activities reflecting such
dynamics in the demand side. Existing studies
have been successful in modeling such dynamic
interaction between demand and supply. Recent
studies have started to focus on the competition issue for durable product markets with indirect network effects. Those studies build dynamic structural models to investigate how the
competitive market equilibrium evolves in twosided markets (Markovich and Moenius 2009,
Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta 2010). However,
to our best knowledge, little literature has been
developed in formally measuring the extent to
which the competitive structure affects the
unique pricing structure in a two-sided market.
This study tries to measure the impact of
competition on pricing in a two-sided market.
The idea itself is simple. We compare the expected equilibrium prices between two cases.
In one case, the market is assumed to have
competitive structures. In the other case, we
assume that there exists a multi-product monopoly firm. By comparing equilibrium prices
between two cases, we can measure the impact
of competitive structure on pricing. We apply
our idea to a data set obtained from video
game console market. In the industry, there are
two major players – Sony and Nintendo. Since
the observed market is oligopoly, the monopoly
case is a counterfactual case. In order for the
comparison to be meaningful, we have to have
estimates of structural parameters on demand

and supply. Thus we develop an equilibrium
model and obtain estimates of structural parameters and the parameter estimates are used
as inputs to counterfactual analyses. The equilibrium model is derived from the interaction
between the demand model that accounts for
consumers’ forward-looking behaviors and the
supply side model that incorporates competitive
dynamics in a two-sided market. We utilize
the numerical framework developed by Dubé,
Hitsch and Chintagunta (2010) to compute the
equilibrium prices.
The results of our analysis indicate that the
merged firm in the monopoly market is more
likely to set higher prices than competing firms
in the duopoly market do from the introduction
stage. This is because the merged firm does
not need to care about the initial advantage as
much as the competing firms do. The competing firms in the duopoly market need to set
lower prices to capture initial advantages in installed bases so that they can benefit from indirect network effects, finally to dominate the
market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we discuss the previous studies
that explore the research problems on the market with indirect network effects and dynamic
structural models. Section 3 describes the modeling framework that incorporates consumers’
and firms’ forward-looking behaviors to solve
for equilibrium and to analyze the impact of
competition on market outcomes. Section 4 briefly

describes video game console industry data used
in the study. Section 5 provides detailed explanations on the parameter estimation procedure, numerical simulation to compute the
equilibrium along with the discussion of our
results. Section 6 summarizes this study and
suggests directions for future research.

Ⅱ. Literature Review
Since the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro
(1985), there has been an extensive theoretical
literature on two-sided markets incorporating
indirect network effects. The studies by Caillaud
and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003)
are among the pioneers in this area as they
identify and characterize the indirect network
effect that distinguishes the market from onesided markets and also describe the determinants of equilibrium prices. Subsequent studies
extend the scope of research to various issues
such as product strategies (Sun, Xie and Cao
2004), market leadership determinants (Nair,
Chintagunta and Dubé 2004, Argentesi and
Filistrucchi 2007, Tellis, Yin and Niraj 2009),
market evolution (Gupta, Jain and Sawhney
1999, Markovich and Moenius 2009, Dubé, Hitsch
and Chintagunta 2010) and pricing (Park 2004,
Kaiser and Wright 2006, Liu 2010). The theoretical model by Godes, Ofek and Sarvary (2009)
investigates the impact of competition among
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platforms on media firms’ profits and actions.
Their study examines the extent to which the
unbalanced pricing strategy in media industry
varies across the competition intensity. It compares the duopoly cases to the monopoly case
to investigate how the competition affects media
firm strategies in a two-sided context. Empirical
studies utilize market data (see for example
Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004; Park 2004;
Kaiser and Song 2006; Dubé, Hitsch and
Chintagunta 2010; Liu 2010) or field experiments (Tucker and Zhang 2010). Table 1 classifies the studies in the two-sided market literature based on product types and main research issues. In terms of modeling, durable
goods markets and non-durable goods markets
differ in extent to which consumers engage in
forward-looking behaviors regarding the deci-

sions to join the platform.
There is extensive literature that models decision makers’ dynamic behaviors formally. Such
studies focus on incorporating the role of consumers’ and firms’ beliefs and on purchase and
marketing decisions. According to Chintagunta,
Erdem, Rossi and Wedel (2006), dynamic structural models contain three common components:
1) time and uncertainty, 2) decision makers’
objective functions and current information
available, and 3) multi-period objective functions to be maximized. That is, decision makers
get the information on the current choice set
and make decision to maximize their expected
utilities given the information available. Rust
(1987) utilizes a nested fixed point algorithm
to solve a stochastic discrete choice dynamic
programming problem and applies the model to

<Table 1> Studies on Two-sided Markets

Industry
General

Durables

Consumables1b

Topics
Platform Competition
Product Strategy
Market Identification
Market Evolution
Pricing
Platform Competition
Pricing
Market Evolution
Advertising Effect

Studies
Katz and Shapiro (1985), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet
and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006)
Sun, Xie and Cao (2004)
Rochet and Tirole (2006)
Gupta, Jain and Sawhney (1999), Markovich and Moenius
(2009)1c, Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta (2010)1a, 1c, Nair,
Chintagunta and Dubé (2004)1a, Tellis, Yin and Niraj (2009)1a
Park (2004)1a,1c, Liu (2010)1a, 1c
Godes, Sarvary and Ofek (2009)
Kaiser and Wright (2006)
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007)
Kaiser and Song (2006), Tucker and Zhang (2010)

1a. empirically measures the size of indirect network effects compared to quality effects
1b. mostly includes advertising-supported media industries
1c : incorporates consumers’ and /or firms’ forward-looking behaviors
40 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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the replacement behavior of bus engines. However,
the curse of dimensionality is raised as a limitation of the nested fixed point procedure and
several studies have tried to relieve the dimensionality problem. One of popular approaches
to overcome the curse of dimensionality is the
conditional choice probabilities approach suggested by Hotz and Miller (1993) that establishes the existence of a one-to-one mapping
between the conditional valuation functions for
the dynamic problem and their associated conditional choice probabilities.
Dynamic models of forward-looking behaviors
have been used extensively for studying various topics in marketing such as adoption of a
new product, purchase decision for consumer
packed goods, effect of learning, and market
evolution. Table 2 tries to summarize major re-

search issues explored by marketing studies on
dynamic models. In dynamic models, researchers
need to make explicit assumption on what components decision makers are uncertain about.
For example, consumers may be uncertain about
the promotion timing of the product and may
form expectations on the chance of promotional
events. Similarly firms may face uncertainty
on the level of demand and thus form expectations on distribution of future demands. Such
modeling of expectation of decision makers is a
core component of a dynamic model. Table 3
classifies the studies of forward-looking behaviors based on components decision makers are
uncertain about. Some of them build dynamic
structural demand models to explain consumers’ forward-looking behaviors and others account for both consumers’ and firms’ dynamic

<Table 2> Topics in Studies of Forward-looking Behaviors

Topic
Learning
Consideration Set and Search Cost
Purchase Incidence / Timing
Brand Choice/Switching
New Product Adoption
R&D, Product Innovation
Product Replacement
Product Launch and Exit
Consumer Inventory
Pricing
Market evolution
2a
2b
2c

Studies
Erdem and Keane1996)2a, Ackerberg(2003)2a
Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivasan(2003)2a
Gönül and Srinivasan(1996)2a, Sun(2005)2a
Sun, Neslin and Srinivasan(2003)2a, Erdem, Keane and Strebel(2005)2a,
Sun(2005)
Song and Chintagunta(2003)2a
Goettler and Gordon(2011)2b
Rust(1987)2a, Gordon(2009)2a
Hitsch(2006)2c
Erdem, Imai and Keane(2003)2a, Hendel and Nevo(2006)2a
Nair(2007)2b, Liu(2010)2c
Markovich and Moenius(2009)2a, Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta(2010)2b

: builds dynamic structural demand models
: builds dynamic structural models of demand and firm behavior
: builds dynamic structural supply models
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<Table 3> Uncertainty Components in Studies of Forward-looking Behaviors

Uncertainty components
Promotion expectation
Price expectation

Studies
Gönül and Srinivasan(1996), Sun, Neslin and Srinivasan(2003), Sun(2005),
Erdem, Imai and Keane(2003), Nair(2007), Mehta, Rajiv and
Srinivasan(2003), Hendel and Nevo(2006)
Rust(1987), Erdem and Keane(1996), Ackerberg(2003), Markovich and
Quality expectation
Moenius(2009), Goettler and Gordon(2011)
Price and Quality expectation Song and Chintagunta(2003), Erdem, Keane and Strebel(2005), Gordon(2009)
Hitsch(2006), Markovich and Moenius(2009), Liu(2010), Goettler and
Demand expectation
Gordon(2011)
Price and Demand expectation Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta(2010)

behaviors and solve for market equilibrium.
Closely related to our research, Liu (2010)
and Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta (2010) integrate these two research streams and explore
marketing issues in a two-sided market by formulating dynamic structural models. Liu (2010)
analyzes whether video game console firms have
incentives for price skimming or price penetration by studying a dynamic pricing game
between firms under indirect network effects,
consumer heterogeneity and oligopolistic competition between platforms. He estimates the
model parameters and uses the estimation results to numerically solve for the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium. Then he simulates the market
evolution by using the obtained equilibrium on
two firms’ pricing policies and concludes that
video game console industry follows the skimming price pattern. His approach is also used
to compute the biases when either network effects, consumer heterogeneity, or dynamic pricing decision is not incorporated into the model
42 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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and assesses the impact of key components in
the framework. His paper also measures the
degree of indirect network effects relative to
that of price-quality effects and provides various policy simulations.
Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta (2010, DHC
hereafter) measure tipping or market dominance
induced by the indirect network effect in a
durable market where forward-looking consumers
and forward-looking firms interact. Their study
quantifies the degree of tipping and also provides an elaborate computational procedure to
analyze forward-looking agents’ behaviors in a
two-sided market. While our study has a very
different research objective from DHC, we utilize the computational procedure described in
DHC to numerically compute the equilibrium
prices in a two-sided market where both consumers and firms are forward-looking. And we
modify the framework in the supply side to incorporate the hypothetical market structure (i.e.
monopoly) as well as the observed market struc-

ture (i.e. duopoly). Such an inclusion of hypothetical market structure is needed to measure
the impact of competition on pricing in a twosided market. In the monopoly case, the merged
firm would coordinate marketing activities for
multiple brands in order to maximize the firm
level value, which would lead to different pricing behaviors from the oligopoly case.
One might argue if it is important to measure the impact of competition on pricing, using
existing methodological framework, especially
where it is well expected that a monopoly would
result in higher prices than a duopoly would
do. We believe such measurement has academic
values under the tradition of new empirical industrial organization. For example, Nevo(2000)
measures the impact of possible mergers in the
cereal market on market prices, using the
methodological approach developed by Berry,
Levinshon, and Pakes (1995). Dube (2005) also
measures the impact of possible mergers in the
soft drink industry, using the econometric modeling approach developed by Hendel (1999). Our
study measures the impact of market structure
on pricing but it differentiated from previous
merger studies such as Nevo (2000) and Dube
(2005) in the sense that we need to take into
account the market evolution in the two-sided
market unlike the their studies. That is why
we utilize the modeling framework developed
by DHC.

Ⅲ. Model
3.1 Indirect Network Effects
Video game console market is a prototypical
two-sided market with indirect network effects.
The structure of the market for video game
consoles (hardware) and game titles (software)
is general enough so it can be easily applied to
another two-sided market with a platform and
its complementary products. We use an equilibrium modeling framework developed by DHC.
We assume that a game title is compatible with
only one type of consoles, which is the case in
the industry. We interchangeably use the word
“platform” with console. The game titles compatible with platform j at time t+1 target consumers who have purchased the platform j up
to period t. Therefore, software provision is determined by the number of consumers who own
the corresponding hardware. This notion of the
indirect network effect between game provision
and hardware demand is modeled by a standard log-log model as depicted in equation (1).
(1)
where  is the number of software titles
that are compatible with platform j at time t
and  is the cumulative share of platform j’s
installed hardware base at time t.
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3.2 Consumer Decision
Consumers’ utility for a hardware alternative
is derived from the benefit of available software in the market. In evaluating a hardware
option, forward-looking consumers consider not
only current software availability for that hardware but also the present value of future software availability for the platform. Since the
future software provision is a function of the
future installed base as depicted in equation
(1), those consumers make expectations on the
evolution of the installed base in order to assess the utility associated with the purchase of
a particular hardware option. Thus, the state
space comprises of the installed base of hardware alternatives. The evolution of the vector
of the installed hardware bases is given by the
following equation.

Since the software provision is a function of
installed hardware base, the software value is
expressed as a function of the installed base as
follows.
(4)
where  is the discount factor for consumers
and uj(∙) is per-period utility. The value can
be computed recursively based on Bellman
equation as follows.
(5)
Consumers compare the choice-specific value
of purchase and value of waiting to make a
choice decision. The value of purchasing platform j at time t is given by

(2)
where  is the platform j specific demand
shock at time t, which is unknown to its competitors until its sales is realized, is independent
and identically distributed across time and has
the probability density function of  · .
Consumers also expect that hardware firms set
prices using information on expected installed
bases and platform specific demand shock as
follows:




(3)
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(6)
where  is the intrinsic preference for platform j,  is marginal utility of income or price
sensitivity, and  is an iid type 1 extreme
value random term to account for unobservable
individual consumer specific utility. This assumption of type 1 extreme value distribution
leads to closed form logit choice probability expressions for market shares. If a consumer does
not buy any platform, the consumer forgoes
consumption in that period and will choose the




best alternative in the next period. Thus the
value of delaying the purchase is denoted as

(7)
In the expression, the value of purchase delay, apart from the type 1 extreme value distributed random term, is given by the discounted expected maximum utility that can be
obtained in the next period. Then, the market
share of platform j is given by the logit formula as follows:

terest is the price differential across different
competitive structures. We posit two market
structures. One is the real market structure
that the data are obtained from. It is a duopoly
market in which Sony and Nintendo are considered to act independently. The other is a
hypothetical market structure in which only
one firm produces both Playstation and Nintendo
64. By comparing the pricing behavior of the
merged firm in the hypothetical monopoly with
the pricing behaviors of independently competing firms, we can assess the impact of competitive structure on pricing. So, unlike DHC,
our study considers two market structures that
might result in different pricing behaviors.

3.3.1 Oligopoly
(8)
Given the market share, the installed base
evolution in equation (2) can be rewritten as
follows.
(9)

3.3 Firm Decision

Suppose J platforms compete in the market
and consumers single-home or, in other words,
choose at most one platform in the whole period.
Consumers are assumed to make rational expectations on the firms’ policy function and
consumer expectations are unbiased. Thus consumer expectation in equation (3) is assumed
to be the same as the true pricing policy.
(10)

The major difference between our study and
DHC lies in firm decision. This study is interested in the impact of exogenous competitive
structure on pricing. The main quantity of in-

Firms are also assumed to expect rationally,
so they anticipate that consumer side market
will evolve based on equations (9). Platform j’s
per-period profit function is given by
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3.3.2 Monopoly

(11)
where  is the marginal cost of production,
 is the royalty rate from software suppliers,
   is the number of software titles sold
at time t and     is the policy function
of firms other than firm j. Note that the hardware manufacturer’s profit consists of the sales
profit from end-users and the royalty fees from
game developers. Then the expected present
value of profit for platform j is written by

In order to figure out the effect of competition on pricing, we consider a hypothetical case
where competing firms are merged to a monopoly firm offering J different hardware products.
The merged firm has the following profit function.






(14)

 





where  is the demand shock specific for
platform k. Then Bellman equation is given as


(15)

3.4 Equilibrium
(12)
where  is the discount factor of hardware
firms and  is the vector of price policies of J
firms. Firm j will choose the policy function
that maximizes the equation (12) and the value function can be expressed in Bellman equation as in the following equation.


Given the behaviors of software suppliers,
consumers and console firms, we solve for Markov
Perfect Equilibrium in which the strategies depend only on the payoff-relevant information.
Consumers and firms are assumed to expect
and act rationally so that their expectations and
realized actions are mutually consistent.

Ⅳ. Data
(13)
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We apply our model to a market data set

obtained from the video game console industry
in the United States, provided by NPD Techworld’s
point of sales database. The data consist of
monthly observations of price, hardware unit
sales and the number of compatible software
titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64
from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony
PlayStation was released to the market a year
before Nintendo 64 was launched. This data set
was also used in other marketing studies such
as Liu (2010) and Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta
(2010). Table 4 presents descriptive statistics.
The sales volumes indicate that Playstation is
more popular than Nintendo 64. Such popularity
is also exemplified in the number of software
titles available. In terms of prices, two platforms are not different much. The variabilities
are large, mostly due to the nonstationarity in
the data series.
In addition to the sales data, we obtain the
producer price indices (PPIs) from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics for computers, computer storage devices, and audio/video equipment to control for technology costs. We also
collect the information on the exchange rate
(JPY per USD) to control for the costs asso-

ciated with the imported console parts. We also
include in the set of exogenous variables a time
trend to account for declining marginal production costs for platforms. And monthly fixed
effects are used to control for seasonal demand
and price peaks. The time trend and monthly
fixed effects are also considered to drive the
demand variation and thus included in demand
models. And all the exogenous variables - time
trend, monthly fixed effects, PPIs and exchange
rates - are considered to affect costs and therefore included in price functions.

Ⅴ. Estimation and Simulation
5.1 Demand Estimation
Our model explicitly recognizes price endogeneity.
The unobserved shock in the demand reflected
in the value function in equation (6) also appears in pricing function shown in equation
(3). So prices and the unobserved shocks are
correlated in the value function equation (6).
The standard estimation of the model parame-

<Table 4> Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Data

Hardware Sales
Hardware Prices
Software Variety

Sony PlayStation
Mean
Std. dev.
275,127
288,832
122
31
697
335

Mean
195,545
120
156

Nintendo 64
Std. dev.
200,403
34
105
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ters in log-odds obtained by inverting the share
equation (8) would lead to biased estimates. In
order to address the price endogeneity issue,
we utilize the control function approach suggested by Petrin and Train (2010).
Dynamic structural models would incorporate
consumers’ belief on the evolution of state variables and the beliefs are typically estimated in
a nested fixed point approach as illustrated in
Rust(1987). That is, the solution to the consumers’ dynamic adoption decision is nested
within the demand estimation procedure. Such
approach would involve discretizing the continuous
state spaces in order to compute the consumers’
dynamic choice outcome at each value of demand
parameters. However, such approach methodology would naturally suffer from the curse of
dimensionality and the state space in our application is large enough to lead to the curse of
dimensionality. So we utilize a two-stage estimation framework suggested by Dube, Hitsch,
and Chintagunta (2010) as described below.

5.1.1 First Stage
In the first stage of the two-step approach,
we estimate the reduced form relationship between market outcome variables and state
variables. That is, we estimate the software
provision, firms’ pricing policies and consumers’
purchase decision with respect to installed hardware base of platforms and demand shocks in
the market. First, the software provision func48 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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tion is specified as
(16)
where  is the platform j’s installed base
at the beginning of time t+1 and  is a normal random term, i.e.,  ∼     . econd,
the firms’ pricing policies are expressed in a
reduced form as follows.
  








(17)
where  is the competitors’ installed base
at the beginning of time t,  is the exogenous
variables including time trend, monthly dummy variables, PPIs and exchange rates. The
random error  follows a normal distribution,
i.e.,  ∼     . The function  can take
various forms and here we choose a quadratic
function of the installed based as that specification fits data best.1) Third, we estimate the
consumers’ purchase decision using the log-odds
of market shares. Given the functional form for
the market share in equation (8), the log-odds
are given by the following equation:
 











(18)

Here,  is the set of exogenous variables that
affect consumers’ purchase decisions including
time trend and monthly fixed effects. The
random measurement error  is assumed to
follow a normal distribution, i.e.,  ∼     .
As mentioned earlier, we include the control function to handle endogeneity in prices. Using the
distributional properties of random measurement
errors, we estimate parameters
by maximizing the likelihood function.
The likelihood function to be maximized is given
as follows.










(19)
Here, the subscript j stands for product, i.e., j
= Sony, Nintendo.

The estimation results from software supply
function, pricing function and market share
function are presented in Table 5, Table 6 and
Table 7, respectively. As expected, from Table
5, we find a significant and positive relationship between the software variety and the installed base of each platform. For the pricing,
as presented in Table 6, it appears that price is
positively related to own installed base and
negatively related to competitor’s installed based,
which is intuitive. Firms would want to exploit
the large value of own installed base by charging high prices and also to cope with the large
value of competitor’s installed base by lowering
own price. Negative quadratic term indicates
that such effect is concave. Consumer utility,
as shown in Table 7, turns out to be positively
related to both own installed base and competitor’s installed base, which is intuitive as the
utility of a brand is relative to the no-purchase
option.

5.1.2 Second Stage
The parameter estimates obtained in the first
stage are reduced form parameters. In order to
assess the impact of competition on pricing, we

<Table 5> Software Provision

Intercept
yj
log( )

Sony PlayStation
Estimate
Std. error
8.0549
0.0067
0.7396
0.0028
-1.8607 (Estimate)

Nintendo 64
Estimate
Std. error
8.8035
0.0076
1.6578
0.0028
0.0069 (Standard Error)
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<Table 6> Pricing Policies

Intercept
ySony
yNintendo
y2Sony
y2Nintendo
Time
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
PPI16a
PPI26b
PPI36c
Exchange rate 16d
Exchange rate 26e
Note.
Note.



Sony PlayStation
Estimate
Std. error
7.0557
0.0222
0.5255
0.3520
-13.8021
0.5584
-1.8074
1.8098
-2.1695
3.8213
0.0348
0.0000
-0.2185
0.0044
-0.1879
0.0041
-0.1805
0.0040
-0.1720
0.0036
-0.1418
0.0029
-0.1721
0.0028
-0.1230
0.0032
-0.2256
0.0036
-0.2279
0.0039
-0.2533
0.0060
-0.1467
0.0042
0.1968
0.0530
2.6621
0.0481
-4.3662
0.0295
0.1194
0.0194
-0.1791
0.0091
-1.9652
0.0125

Nintendo 64
Estimate
Std. error
6.4912
0.0216
-4.3989
0.3176
14.4230
0.6705
-4.1352
2.6410
-0.9662
5.7801
-0.0131
0.0001
0.0875
0.0038
0.0952
0.0034
-0.0093
0.0043
0.1189
0.0038
0.0854
0.0045
0.0807
0.0041
0.0733
0.0041
0.0026
0.0039
-0.0597
0.0040
-0.0376
0.0041
-0.0051
0.0026
-0.1403
0.0621
2.8525
0.0596
-3.5104
0.0353
-0.0869
0.0213
-0.6672
0.0143
-1.9652
0.0125

Producer Price Index for computers (6a), for computer storage devices (6b) and for audio/video equipment (6c)
JPY per USD exchange rates with 3-month lags (6d) and with 7-month lags (6e)

need to have policy invariant structural parameters.
In the second stage of the estimation, we estimate the structural parameters via a minimum
distance procedure that matches simulated
consumer choices to observed data. The structural parameters include intrinsic preference
(), price sensitivity ( ), software utility (),
and the standard deviation of demand shock
( ). The idea is that the simulated log-odds
ratio at the true value of the structural param
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eters should be approximately equal to the observed log-odds ratio. When we simulate the
log-odds, we use the estimated value of the
first stage parameters in computing the choice
specific valuation functions. That is, we simulate outcome variables in the second stage based
on the relationship estimated in the first stage.
In detail, we draw random numbers for  , demand shocks of platform j at period t from standard normal distributions. Here,       in


<Table 7> Log-odds of Market Shares

Intercept
ySony
yNintendo
y2Sony
y2Nintendo
Time
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
 Sony
 Nintendo
2
 Sony
2
 Nintendo
i

Sony PlayStation
Estimate
Std. error
-3.5242
0.0153
11.8477
0.7056
4.3025
1.2197
-6.2032
3.3483
-1.2868
7.7446
-0.0108
0.0009
-0.3448
0.0092
-0.2866
0.0083
-0.2914
0.0082
-0.2181
0.0072
-0.1421
0.0051
-0.1699
0.0052
-0.0866
0.0054
-0.0899
0.0066
-0.0046
0.0076
-0.0260
0.0112
0.0381
0.0065
0.2030
0.0040
-0.0338
0.0034
0.0899
0.0023
-0.0112
0.0028
-3.2036
0.0015

Nintendo 64
Estimate
Std. error
-3.4584
0.0232
3.4502
1.0409
5.4781
1.9147
1.5997
5.6435
0.7488
13.5826
0.0053
0.0011
-0.5244
0.0138
-0.4403
0.0125
-0.4578
0.0129
-0.3155
0.0101
-0.2785
0.0078
-0.3162
0.0082
-0.1662
0.0087
-0.1994
0.0099
-0.1470
0.0107
-0.1476
0.0162
-0.0201
0.0084
0.2853
0.0056
-0.0523
0.0067
0.1243
0.0033
-0.2278
0.0053

dicates simulation draw and  denotes the total number of draws in the simulation. We
simulate outcome variables by iterating on the
following equations:

We then simulate choice-specific values and
value of waiting to match the observed market
share to the simulated one. We simulate the
values by iterating on the equations as follows:

(20)
(21)
(22)

(25)

(23)
(24)

where
denotes the
set of structural parameters to be estimated in
the second stage and
is the
expected present value of software which is si-
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mulated as
(26)
where
.
This is the per-period software utility which is
assumed to be proportional to the number of
available software titles. The simulated value
of waiting is the average expected present value of waiting over R draws.
(27)
The expected discounted value of waiting for
each draw is denoted as
(28)
where
is the probability
that a consumer has not purchased any platform
up to time t and
is
the probability that a consumer has purchased
platform j up to time t. And the term  given by

is the discounted sum of the per-period utility
of waiting given that a consumer has not entered the hardware market and the per-period
utility of software given that a consumer has
adopted one of the platforms prior to time t. In
our numerical application, we set the discount
factor  at 0.9 and replicate simulation 60 times
(R=60).
Next, the estimation involves finding the values of structural parameters at which the distance between the simulated log-odds of market shares and the observed ones is minimized.
Again, the structural parameters    
     include intrinsic preferences

for each platform, marginal disutility of price,
marginal utility of software titles and standard
deviation of demand shocks. The distance between the observed log-odds of market shares
and the simulated ones is given by






(30)
where  is the true parameter values. The
minimum distance estimator is obtained by
solving the minimization problem, i.e.,


(31)
(29)
is the per-period utility of waiting at time t.
The expected present discounted value of waiting
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where  is a positive semi-definite weight
matrix. We use an identity matrix for the weight.
The estimation results are provided in Figure
1, Figure 2 and Figure 3. Figure 1 depicts the

estimated game provision and the observed
game provision. Figure 2 displays the observed
prices along with fitted prices for hardware.
Finally Figure 3 displays the log-odds. The
MAPDs of game provision are 11.38% and 23.54

for Playstation and Nintendo 64 respectively.
For prices, the MAPDs are 8.48% and 8.68%.
And for log-odds, the MAPDs are 5.81% and
6.74%. The model appears to capture well the
observed market outcomes up to random fluc-

<Figure 1> In-Sample Fit : Game Provision
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<Figure 2> In-Sample Fit : Price

tuations, especially for prices and log-odds.
The estimates of the structural parameters
are presented in Table 8. We do not find any
significant difference between the intrinsic
preference for Sony and for Nintendo. Marginal
54 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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utility of income is estimated to be significant.
The indirect network effect, as reflected in the
software utility , is estimated to be positive
although its standard error is very large.

<Figure 3> In-Sample Fit : Log-odds of Market Share

<Table 8> Structural Parameters
 Sony
 Nintendo




Estimate
-0.4972
-0.4454
0.0192
0.0061
0.0511

Standard error
6.9260
0.4989
0.0005
0.1090
0.0548
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5.2 Equilibrium Prices
The whole point of this paper is to investigate the impact of competition on pricing
behavior. Since the data is obtained from an
industry under duopoly competition, the observed prices include the competitive effects.
Now we are ready to conduct counterfactual
experiments as we have estimated structural
parameters. We compute the expected prices
for the hypothetical monopoly case where two
companies are merged and compare such
counterfactual prices with observed prices to
identify the impact of competition on pricing.
Given model parameters, we numerically compute equilibrium hardware prices through value
function iteration. The algorithm iterates expected software value, choice-specific value, value
of waiting and new pricing policies until value
functions change little. The pricing strategy that
corresponds to the converged value function is
the policy function. The detailed computation
procedure is as follows:
We first discretize the state spaces
for installed hardware base, demand shocks and
pricing policies of each firm. Installed hardware
base in the state space is discretized in Y grids
and each grid consists of two elements, each of
which is Sony PlayStation’s installed base and
Nintendo 64’s installed base. The sum of the
installed hardware base on each grid is smaller
Step 1.
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than 1 by definition. Demand shocks are discretized based on N-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule. We integrate out demand shocks in
the subsequent steps by evaluating the integrand
at the quadrature nodes. Pricing policies of
each firm are discretized into P uniformly spaced
grids, respectively.
Step 2. We take initial guesses on the consumers’ expectations on the evolution of the
installed hardware base     and pricing
policies     . We assume reasonable initial
values by reflecting the relationship between
the outcome variables to be evolved and the
state variables from the data. Note that the
initial guesses should be one of the discretized
grids. We take the discretized values which have
the minimum distances from the expected outcomes from the data as initial values.
Step 3. We compute    , the expected
present value of software titles using equation
(5) given    . The per-period utility of
software
is calculated using discretized state grids, the estimated relationship between installed hardware
base and software variety provided in Table 5
and the estimated structural parameters provided in Table 8. Note that the integral over 
space is the weighted average of the integrand
over the discretized quadrature nodes. We iterate    on the contraction mapping until
both    and    converge.
Step 4. Based on    computed in step


 




 



 







 



 





 

 

3 and structural parameters provided in Table 8,
we calculate choice-specific values,       ,
from the equation (6).
Step 5. We calculate     , value of
waiting from the equation (7) by iterating the
value on the contraction mapping. The equation is equal to




 



 

Step 7.

We compute the per-period profit
function and the corresponding Bellman equation from the equation (11) and (12) for the
oligopoly case and (14) and (15) for the monopoly case on each value of discretized pricing
policies. Thus the Bellman equation computed
has dimensions that are P times greater than
the dimensions of the values and Bellman
equations calculated in the previous steps. Note
that    is estimated from the data.2)
Since we control for falling marginal costs by
including exogenous variables, we assume constant marginal costs3) in the empirical model.
Step 8. We find new pricing policies    
that maximize the Bellman equation converged
in step 7 on each state space grid and compute
the maximized Bellman equation corresponding
to the pricing policies of each standard from
the equation (13) for the oligopoly case and
(15) for the monopoly case.
Step 9. We update pricing policies as  
    and consumers’ expectations about the
installed hardware base as     . We iterate from step 3 to step 7 until the policy
function converges. Here, we use the modified
Newton-Raphson method,4) one of the damp

(32)
The above equation utilizes the property of
Type Ι Extreme Value distribution. Note that
the integrand consists of value of waiting and
choice-specific values evaluated at time t+1,
not at time t. We iterate     on the contraction mapping until the value converges.
Step 6. We calculate and update the market
share from the equation (8) based on the updated values from step 4 and 5. The installed
hardware base evolves according to the equation (9). We take the value on the discretized
space as the new installed base which has the
minimum distance from the updated installed
hardware base.


 

  











2) Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta(2010) estimate the relationship between the installed hardware base and the number of
software titles sold as
from CES preference model. We use the parameters reported to
estimate the software sales.
3) Marginal production costs are set to be $147 (Sony PlayStation) and $122 (Nintendo 64) and royalty fees are assumed
to be $9 (Sony PlayStation) and $18 (Nintendo 64) based on Liu(2010) and Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta(2010). We
test the robustness of the results with a different cost specification in the appendix.
4)
where  ∈   and the closer  is to 0, the more likely the function
is to converge.
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ing schemes to facilitate convergence since the
multi-agent iteration algorithms may have
multiple equilibria and some of them do not
converge but oscillate.
We use a discount factor of 0.9 for both consumers and firms. We examine a symmetric
competition case where Sony and Nintendo
launch their products at the same time at the
beginning period of this analysis and share the
same demand functions. Our main goal is the
comparison of market outcomes between with
and without competition among manufacturers.
We compare the price policies, price patterns
and price levels in oligopoly market to those in
the merged case. In the merged case, we use the
per-period profit function and Bellman equation as shown in equation (14) and (15) but
hold all other model primitives same as in the
observed duopoly market. Doing so requires an
assumption that parameters are equal across
two competitive regimes. For the demand side,
it is very natural to assume that consumer
preferences and sensitivities are the same across
two hypothetical competitive structures. For the
supply, it requires a more demanding assumption that the cost function is the same between
two competitive structures. To be consistent
with these assumptions, the parameters we
have should be policy-invariant parameters. If
parameters are policy-dependent, then counterfactual comparison is infeasible. That is why
researchers rely on structural modeling approach
to have policy-invariant parameters, as opposed to
58 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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what reduced-from models would do (Chintagunta,
Erdem, Rossi, and Wedel 2006). Our study also
has to rely heavily on microfoundations in order
to have a structural model.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 exhibit equilibrium pricing
policies at each discretized point of hardware
installed base in duopoly and monopoly market,
respectively. Here  stands for installed hardware base of Sony PlayStation and  represents that of Nintendo 64. These figures depict
the equilibrium pricing pattern as a function of
installed base.
While it is possible to display visually the optimal pricing, those figures appear to be very
difficult to interpret. So we depict the expected
price paths in Figure 6. The paths are conditional on cases where consumers and firms make
decisions at the monthly level, both standards
sell as many products as their observed sales
by the end of T=72 and the rates of increase
in their installed base remain constant afterwards.
We simulate the prices for 100 months. The
expected pricing policies are functions of installed hardware base and demand shocks.
Here we generate 60 simulations of the random
transitions of demand shocks and average the
realized prices from the simulations. In addition,
we generate simulations of the market evolution at the same time. The evolution of the
market needs to be simulated since the software provision function, the no-purchase value
function and the Bellman equations in the supply side depend on the installed hardware base

<Figure 4> Equilibrium Pricing Policies in Duopoly Market

in the subsequent period.
The temporal patterns appear similar for both
standards and for both industry structures.
The manufacturers bring down their product
prices over time. Notably, the price levels dif-

ferentiate duopoly and monopoly markets. The
firms would not lower prices enough unless
they do not have competition in the platform
market. When firms compete, they focus on
capturing initial advantage and enticing more
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<Figure 5> Equilibrium Pricing Policies in Monopoly Market

consumers to join their networks by setting
lower prices. Note that a two-sided market is
distinguished from a traditional market since
consumers’ adoption decisions are affected by
indirect network effects. That is, a standard
60 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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with initial advantage gets positive feedbacks
from its consumers and its software suppliers.
The initial advantage leads to more software
variety for the standard than its competitors.
Hence, more consumers will purchase the plat-

<Figure 6> Expected Price Paths

form than other standards in the subsequent
period. This asymmetric adoption rate reinforces
the leadership of the standard, helps the platform’s network to create a virtuous cycle and
finally leads to market concentration in favor

of the standard. Given this, competing platforms have a strong incentive to invest during
relatively early periods to accumulate installed
bases. The investment incentive is realized in
the form of lower prices.
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<Figure 7> Expected Software Provision

However, the merged firm in the hypothetical
monopoly does not have to take account of the
initial advantage or the risks that consumers
might prefer other standards over its product at
the introduction stage. It has been well demon62 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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strated that in static models such as Nevo
(2000) and Dube (2005) joint profit maximization
in a monopoly clearly results in a different
payoff from that obtained in independent profit
maximization in a competitive market. The

price differential between two competitive regimes in static model settings comes mostly
from the ability of the monopoly firm to internalize consumer switching behaviors across
brands. In a dynamic setting as in our model,
such internalization extends to indirect network
externalities. The internalization of consumer
switching (consumers’ purchase of a platform
at the expense of other platform) occurs not
only at the immediate market share level but
also at the software provision level. Because of
the positive feedback inherent in a two-sided
market, competing platforms have an incentive
to behave aggressively to increase the indirect
network (e.g., the number of compatible software titles). But the monopoly firm does not
have to be aggressive as it internalizes switching
that occurs due to the availability of complements.
Thus the monopoly firm has much less incentive
to invest. Rather it has an incentive to harvest
by charging relatively higher prices. So the price
gaps between the duopoly and the monopoly
are highlighted in relatively early periods. Since
the monopoly would invest less, the complement
market (software title market) grows at a much
slower rate as shown in Figure 7. This result is
robust to a different cost specification and the
marginal costs are simulated in the appendix.

In addition to the visual displays, we also
quantify the impact of competition on dynamic
pricing of platforms as the average percentage
changes in prices and in consumers’ values from
duopoly to monopoly market for each standard.
The percentage change is computed by the ratio of the difference between the values in duopoly market and those in monopoly market to
the values in duopoly market. As shown in
Table 9, the hardware prices go up by 14.8%
for Sony PlayStation and by 21.8% for Nintendo
64 on average when we eliminate the competition among platforms exogenously. The merged
manufacturer increases Nintendo 64’s price more
than Sony PlayStation’s price in terms of percentage because the supplier of Nintendo 64 in
the duopoly market sets relatively lower prices
to capture initial advantage so that it can benefit
from higher royalty fees from game developers.
Note that Nintendo 64 collects higher royalty
fee for each software title sold than Sony
PlayStation does in the empirical model. The
competing firms in the duopoly market focus
on different competitive advantages. The removal of competition would result in a decrease
of consumer value by 43.1% on average. The
increase in price and the consequent decrease
in the variety of software titles in the market

<Table 9> Percentage Change in Price and Consumer Value

Mean
Median

Sony Price
14.8
14.0

Nintendo Price
21.8
10.2

Customer Value
-43.1
-34.7
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would lead to lower consumers’ surplus.

Ⅵ. Conclusion
This study provides a framework to examine
the impact of the competitive structure on
firms’ optimal pricing strategies in a two-sided
market. We calibrate the demand model that
incorporates indirect network effects, consumers’
forward-looking behaviors and manufacturers’
dynamic competition by estimating parameters
that minimize the distance between simulated
log-odds of market share and observed ones.
We utilize the estimation results in conducting
counterfactual analyses for the effect of competition.
We quantify the impact of exogenously determined competition structure on pricing as
the percent changes in prices and consumer
values for each platform. The empirical application of the model to the U.S. 32/64 bit video
game console category reveals that firms set
higher prices in the absence of competition by
14.8% and 21.8% for Sony PlayStation and
Nintendo 64, respectively. Such removal of
competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. This result is attributed
to the distinct property of a two-sided market
that competing firms tend to set low prices
particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually to
64 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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dominate the market.
Future research in various directions to relax
the assumptions in this research will help shed
light on the related topics. First, we here do
not take account of first-mover advantage. Sony
entered the video game console market with the
new generation of PlayStation one year earlier
than Nintendo did. Since we intend to analyze
the effect of firms’ dynamic decisions under
various market structures, we only consider the
periods when both firms sell the products in
the market. If the first-mover advantage is
taken into account in the model, the standard
that pioneers the market will have the initial
installed base advantage. This initial advantage
causes more software developers to supply game
titles compatible with the standard. Thus more
consumers will engage in the standard and the
positive feedback will strengthen the market
leadership of the pioneering platform. This
leadership is due to indirect network effects
since consumers prefer to lock in the platform’s
network. Such initial advantage in a two-sided
market will make potential entrants reluctant
to set high prices in the market and the impact of exogenously determined competition in
the market will differ from the results in the
symmetric market investigated in our research.
Another area for future research is to capture
indirect network effects in terms of software
contents or quality. For instance, there are killer applications in smartphone industry that induces consumers to purchase the specific carriers.

We here only consider the software variety to
explain the source of indirect network effects
since the contents is difficult to measure and
incorporate in the model. However, if some of
the applications or software titles take a lot of
fractions in the market and have a great impact on consumers’ purchase decisions, the model
can provide the analysis on the role of game
contents and the different values on the impact
of competition among platforms in the market.
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<Appendix>
We control for declining costs with exogenous cost-shift variables and assume constant marginal costs in
price simulation. Here we estimate parameters for declining costs to verify the robustness of the result.
Liu(2010) specifies the cost function as
(A.1)
where  is hardware sales for standard j,  is marginal cost and  is fixed cost. We assume that
video game console manufacturers do not incur fixed costs and marginal costs decrease exogenously over
time. Following Liu(2010), the marginal costs are assumed to decline exponentially over time which is
denoted as
(A.2)
<Figure A.1> Expected Cost Path

Industry reports on video game console market make comments on marginal costs at a few time periods.
We use the available data to compute the expected cost path throughout the observed periods and display
the result in Figure A.1. We estimate demand parameters and simulate price paths again using the
estimated costs. Although we do not report the full analyses here, the merged firm sets higher prices than
each manufacturer does in the duopoly market. That is, the results are robust to the cost specification.
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